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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
CHARLES B. ROBISON, Case Editor
FEDERAL JURISDICTION -IMMUN-
ITY FROM STATE PROSECUTION.-
[Federal] A troublesome prob-
lem of conflict of jurisdiction
between the state and federal
courts arises where an accused has
been tried and convicted by one
court and is then sought by the
other to answer charges against
him. The rule which attempts to
prevent an actual conflict between
the two systems is that the court to
which jurisdiction first attaches,
whether it involves a person or
property, must be permitted to ex-
haust its action before the other
court can attach its jurisdiction to
the same matter. Ableman v.
Booth, 62 U. S. 506 (1858); Covell
v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176 (1884).
The leading case in this field is
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254
(1921), where the federal govern-
ment waived its right of strict
custody and a committed individ-
ual was allowed to be tried in a
state court while under sentence
to a federal penitentiary. In a
fact situation like this it would be
impossible for the state authorities
to compel the federal government
to relinquish its custody since the
matter is one based entirely on
comity. Marsino v. Hogsett, 37 F.
(2d) 409 "(E. D. Mass. 1930).
In a recent case, In re Craig, 4
L. Wk. 495 (S. D. Ill. 1936), the
accused was convicted in a fed-
eral court and placed on probation
without any commitment to a
penal institution. It was there
held that the accused was not sub-
ject to prosecution in a state court
for a state offense, for this would
be an interference with the pro-
bationary power of the federal
court. This seems to be a con-
siderable extension of immunity
from prosecution but is in accord
with the prior case of Grant v.
Guernsey, 63 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A.
10th, 1933). It was there said, on
the same facts, that the second
prosecution would be a direct in-
terference with the jurisdiction of
the federal court and a violation
of the rule of comity between the
federal and state courts. How-
ever, Circuit Judge Cotteral in his
dissent argued that there would be
no actual -interference with the
probationary power of the federal
court and since the practice of sub-
jecting prisoners to a second trial
is well settled, probation should
not prevent it. But if there were
a commitment after the second
trial there would undoubtedly be
a direct interference with the fed-
eral court's probationary power.
There would seem to be an im-
munity, though, where the ac-
cused is out on bail (Taylor v.
Taintor, 83 U. S. 366, 373 (1872);
[909]
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but see Metcalf v. State, 57 Okla.
64, 156 Pac. 305 (1916)); or where
he is in custody of the federal
court. Ableman v. Booth, supra;
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624
(1883).
Of course, the sovereignty hav-
ing the exclusive jurisdiction may
waive its right and thus subject
the accused to another trial. The
right of retention of jurisdiction
or waiver thereof is one entirely
within the discretion of the sov-
ereignty and the accused may not
raise the prior jurisdiction of one
court as a defense in a second
prosecution. U. S. v. Marrin, 227
Fed. 314 (E .D. Pa. 1915); Ponzi-
v. Fessenden, supra. If the fed-
eral court does waive the right to
exclusive jurisdiction the accused
must be given a full opportunity
for defense and presence at the
second trial, or there is a denial of
due process. Frank v. Mangum,
237 U. S. 309 (1915); Lewis v.
United States, 146 U. S. 370 (1892);
cf. Simmons v. State, 165 Miss. 732,
141 So. 288 (1932).
By statute, 26 STAT. 839 (1891),
amended by 46 STAT. 326 (1930),
18 U. S. C. A. §753f (1936 Supp.),
the attorney general is given con-
trol and custody of all prisoners
committed to federal penitentiaries
and it was under this statute that
the second prosecution was al-
lowed by consent of the attorney
general in Ponzi v. Fessenden,
supra. However, the statute could
hardly be invoked to enable a
second prosecution in the Craig
case since there the attorney gen-
eral had no custody because of no
commitment. Where the convicted
person is put on probation he re-
mains in the custody of the court
and the only procedure by which
the state court could secure cus-
tody would be by getting an order
from the federal court having such
control during the probationary
period. Cf. Ex parte Lamar, 274
Fed. 160 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).




convicted of operating a lottery,
maintained a slot machine which
worked on the same principle as
commercial excavating cranes. In-
side a glass compartment were
prizes placed on a bed of red candy
cinnamon drops, which the operator
of the machine attempted to secure
by setting the crane. After the
machine started into motion the
operator was powerless to control
the course of the crane. The de-
fendant contended that this was a
game of skill and that he sought
to create a market for the articles
inside, which he manufactured.
The jury found, however, that the
element of skill was highly specu-
lative and that the element of
chance predominated. Therefore,
since the defendant was attempt-
ing to dispose of his articles
through a game of chance, he was
properly convicted for running a
lottery. Commonwealth v. Pliss-
ner, 4 N. E. (2d) 241 (Mass. 1936).
The history of lotteries dates
back to the Romans. Some mod-
ern governments have run lottery
schemes to raise revenue, but the
original Roman lotteries were
purely for amusement. Nero gave
such prizes as a house or a slave.
France and Italy used lotteries
frequently before and after Louis
XIV. The first English lottery was
in 1569, but in the next century
they became so frequent that they
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were suppressed as public nui-
sances, and in 1826 they were
finally prohibited. Early America
looked upon lotteries with favor,
and before 1820 numerous acts of
Congress permitted lotteries to
raise money for public purposes.
(See Note, Lotteries and tke Law
(1924) 157 L. T. 480 for an out-
line of the history of lotteries.)
Modern law, however, adopts the
policy that lotteries are bad for
public morals -they incite the
gambling instinct and prey upon
the poor. They are practically
everywhere denounced and pro-
hibited by statute. Pickett, Con-
tests and the Lottery Laws (1932)
45 Harv. L. Rev. 1196; Note, Con-
tests of Skill and the Lottery Laws
(1937) 23 Va. L. Rev. 431.
Interesting though the study of
lotteries may be, this note is
primarily limited to a discussion
of the status of the slot machine
under the gaming and lottery laws.
A slot machine which merely
vends merchandise is not unlaw-
ful. Its illegality rests upon the
element of chance that the player
might receive something of greater
value than the coin used. If skill
is an essential element, then the
machine may possibly escape con-
demnation. Which of the ele-
ments of chance, skill and possi-
bility of greater reward predom-
inates in a given case is the prob-
lem to determine.
In England slot machines have
been held illegal under the gen-
eral gaming statute, Section 4 of
the Gaming Houses Act of 1854,
17 & 18 VIcT., c. 38, where the
penalty imposed is £500, costs and
one year in prison. In Fielding v.
Turner, [1903] 1 K. B. 867, the
game in question consisted in put-
ting a penny in a slot and releas-
ing a spring which forced the
penny upward toward seven com-
partments. Depending upon the
compartment into which it fell the
player got a ticket entitling him
to twopennyworth of articles sold
in the shop, a return of the coin,
or its total loss. This device was
declared illegal. Cf. Thompson v.
Mason, 90 L. T. R. 649 (1904)
(penny operated by hand). A
similar device which shot balls
into cups but which gave no right
to merchandise was also declared
illegal in Roberts v. Harrison, 101
L. T. R. 540 (1909). In each case
the element of skill was said to be
lacking. But although a person
might develop skill in catching a
ball in a sliding cup at the bot-
tom of a device through which a
ball passes among many pins, the
probability was that few people
could attain that skill and such
was declared illegal, both in Eng-
land and Ireland. Bracchi Bros. v.
Rees, 113 L. T. R. 871 (1915);
Donaghy v. Walsh, [1914] 2 Ir. R.
261. The Scotch saw nothing harm-
ful in this game. Di Carlo v.
M'Intyre, [1914] S. C. (J.) 60.
"Diddler," much played in Ireland
a few years ago, was declared un-
lawful in Gordon v. Dunlevy,
[1928] Ir. R. 595. That machine
consisted of inserting a small disc
and pulling a lever, starting the
reels revolving. The player could,
by means of push-buttons, attempt
to control the speed of the reels
and make them stop on a winning
combination. The amount of skill
involved was held not sufficient;
the test was whether skill entered
into the game to such a substantial
extent as to be the predominating
element, and it was not to be tested
by the standard of experts, though
some might by practice insure
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success. Cf. Paul, Games of
Chance (1935) 9 Australian L. J.
43, 46. "Little Stockbroker"
sought to test one's skill by show-
ing elaborate instructions for
operating, and if strictly followed
the chance of winning was fair.
The judge found, however, that
few players ever read the instruc-
tions, but instead took their
chances. The device was con-
dened. Rex v. Brennard, 22 Cr.
App. Rep. 95, 74 S. J. 788 (1930).
In Scotland a machine which gave
discs of no value except for re-
playing the machine for amuse-
ment was legal where there was
no showing that it was used for
gambling. Crolla v. Macpherson,
[1931] S. C. (J.) 4.
Most American states have
general gaming laws broad enough
to cover gambling by slot ma-
chines and a few specifically make
mention of the machine itself. A
typical statute of the latter type
provides fine and imprisonment for
"whoever . . . keeps . . . any
clock, joker, tape or slot machine
or any other device upon which
money is staked or hazarded or
into which money is paid or played
upon chance, or upon the result of
the action of which money or other
valuable thing is staked, bet, haz-
arded, won or lost. . . ." ILL.
STATE BAR STATS. (1935) c. 38,
§321. Such a statute is constitu-
tional. Bobel v. People, 173 Ill.
19, 50 N. E. 322 (1898). Most
courts agree that when the ma.
chine returns tokens exchangeable
for merchandise it is a gambling
device. People v. Kopper, 253 N.
Y. 83, 170 N. E. 501 (1930); see
Note, Slot Machines (1932) 66 U.
S. L. Rev. 63 for a review of the
cases. The fact that a card hung
on the machine, if studied, will en-
able the player to meet measur-
able success will not conceal its
gambling character-"the lure of
the game" is still present. Almy
Mfg. Co. v. Chicago, 202 Ill. App.
240 (1916). The apparently harm-
less "mint vending" machine,
where the tokens may be used only
for amusement in replaying the
machine, has practically every-
where met a similar fate. Jenner
v. State, 173 Ga. 86, 159 S. E. 564
(1931); Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192
Wis. 585, 213 N. W. 335 (1927);
contra: Oberly v. Oklahoma City,
46 Okla. Cr. Rep. 42, 287 Pac. 796
(11930). The added amusement
feature is considered a "thing of
value." State ex rel. Manchester
v. Marvin, 211 Iowa 462, 233 N. W.
486 (1930) noted (1931) 22 J.
Crim. L. 282.
May these machines also be an
infringement of the lottery laws?
Three things are necessary to con-
stitute a lottery-prize, chance and
consideration. If skill is present
there is no lottery, but in none of
the machines considered has the
element of skill been sufficient.
There can be no doubt that chance
is involved in each case. Con-
sideration is present also -the
money necessary to run the ma-
chine. How about prize? The
machine in the present Massachu-
setts case clearly had that ele-
ment, too, so it was condemned as
a lottery. Surely the element of
prize would be equally present
when the tokens are exchangeable
for merchandise. Such a scheme
should come within the statutory
definition "with intent to make the
disposal of such real or personal
property dependent upon or con-
nected with any chance by . . .
game, hazard or other gambling
device, whereby such chance or
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device is made an additional in-
ducement to the disposal or sale
of said property." ILL. STATE BAR
STATS. (1935) c. 38, §401. Cf.
Loveland v. Bode, 214 Ill. App. 399
(191:9) (selling coupons contem-
plating redemption in merchandise
held a lottery); Commonwealth v.
McClintock, 257 Mass. 431, 154 N.
E. 264 (1926) (redeemable to-
kens). In the Almy Mfg. Co. case,
supra, the machine was so consti-
tuted as to pay from 5 cents to 25
cents for the nickel used. The
Illinois court said: "The machine
• . .is, we think, akin to a lottery,
in its operation, coming within the
definition of the lexicographers of
a lottery, which is, 'a scheme for
the distribution of prizes by lot or
chance.'" The ordinary slot ma-
chine which gives something more
than the equivalent in money or
money's worth of the amount in-
serted seems to offend the lottery
laws as well as the general gam-
ing statutes. See Notes (1935) 80
L. J. 305, 306; (1933) 75 id. 130.
Cf. Jenner v. State, supra, where
the lottery clause was included in
the general gaming statute. It is
quite probable, though, that the
suppression of slot machines will
continue under the gaming laws or
the special slot machine laws, ex-
cept in unusual cases such as the
present one where the lottery fea-
ture of the machine is quite evi-
dent.
The Canadian Provinces have
been divided as to just what sort
of machine fell within the gen-
eral gaming laws. The devices
which gave redeemable tokens and
didn't require skill in operation
were generally held illegal. Rex
v. O'Meara, 25 Can. Cr. Cas. 208
(Ont. 19f5), is the leading case
and was followed in Bareham v.
The King, 26 Can. Cr. Cas. 211
(K. B. Que. 1916); Rex v. Arnold,
48 id. 101 (Ont. 1927); Rex v.
Richards, 57 id. 208 (B. C. 1931).
The ordinary mint vending ma-
chine with non-redeemable tokens
was held legal by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Rex v. Wilkes,
[1931] 1 D. L. R. 995. Manitoba
held that a machine which could
be partially controlled by push-
buttons was not a lottery Rex. v.
Liptrot, 50 Can. Cr. Cas. 244
(1928), but the weight of author-
ity is against this case. Rex v.
Wolfe, 50 id. 189 (Alb. 1928); Rex
v. Athonas, 56 id. 146 (Ont. 1931).
Where skill alone is determinative,
as in shooting a dime from a gun
into a target, releasing a pot of
dimes, there is no violation of the
statute. Rex v. Geffler, [1923] 3
D. L. R. 1205 (B. C.).
In the last two years several of
the provinces have gone the whole
way in outlawing slot machines.
Alberta had a Slot Machine Act
in 1924, but it was never enforced,
so she enacted a much broader
statute in 1935. Stats. of Alberta
1935, 25 GFo. V, c. 14. Manitoba
enacted a similar statute. Stats.
of Manitoba 1935, 25 GEO. V, c. 43.
See Legis., The Slot Machine Acts
(1936) 14 Can. B. Rev. 549, 553.
The Alberta statute was upheld in
Rex v. Stanley, [1936] 1 D. L. R.
100 (S. Ct. Alb.). In 1936 New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Sas-
katchewan enacted even broader
statutes: New Brunswick 1936,
1 Evw. VIII, c. 48; Nova Scotia
1936, 1 Eaw. VIII, c. 2; Saskatche-
wan 1936, 1 EDW. VIII, c. 110, re-
pealed by c. 11. The statutes
seemingly are intended to cover
every conceivable type of slot ma-
chine, which is defined as "any
• . . device which [is operated by]
. . . money, coin, token . . . or
other substance [with or without]
. . . any handle, lever, plunger
or other attachment [and which]
. . . delivers or returns or pur-
ports to deliver or return . .
with or without any article of
merchandise . . . any money,
premium, prize, reward, token,
counter, disc, slug, or any thing
which is intended to be or capable
of being exchanged for money or
money's worth or which may be
replayed or re-inserted in such
. . . device to again set it in
operation." Section 2 (b) of the
Manitoba Act, similar to all. This
definition would include all ma-
chines that returned tokens for
whatever purpose; the only ma-
chines exempted would be vend-
ing machines where nothing was
returned except the article worth
exactly the amount inserted-the
pure automatic vending machine.
To effectuate these Acts, property
rights are forbidden in the ma-
chines and they are subject to
seizure and forfeiture without
warrant when discovered. Sas-
katchewan even made them gov-
ernment property outright. Such
drastic Acts are not likely to find
favor in the United States, nor
would they be adequately enforced.
CHARLES B. ROBISON.
JuRoRs - CoNsuruToNAIry OF
STATUTE MAKING FEDERAL Em-
PLOyES ELIGIBLE.-[Federal] At
common law challenges were made
either to the array or to the polls.
Challenges to the polls were either
in principal, which worked an ab-
solute disqualification, or chal-
lenges to favor, which disqualified
for actual bias. That there was no
settled practice at common law
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absolutely disqualifying Crown
servants as jurors is disclosed by
early commentators. FITZHERBERT,
ABRIDGEMENT, Challenge, §§17, 63,
65, folios 172, 173 (1577 Ed.);
STAUNFORDE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN,
162; 2 HAWKxNs, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN, c. 43, §§32, 33; 5 BACON,
ABRIDGEMENT, Juries 355. This is
supported by the early cases. Rex
v. Genney, Keilw. 102a (1508);
Rex v. Parkyns, 13 St. Tr. f63
(1695); The King v. Edmonds, 4
B. & Ald. 471 (1821); Reg. v.
Lacey, 3 Cox Cr. C. 517, 519
(1848).
Blackstone's Commentaries were
doubtless familiar to the framers
of the Constitution, being accepted
as the most satisfactory exposition
of the common law of England.
Schick v. United States, 195 U. S.
65, 69 (1903). Blackstone's state-
ment as to the grounds of a prin-
cipal challenge has relation to
master and servants between pri-
vate parties; there is no mention
made of the practice in Crown
cases where Crown servants are
jurors. 3 Bl. Com. 363. This
omission is not a sufficient basis
for denying the existence of an
exception in Crown cases, nor
that the colonies followed a rule
different from that of England.
The question of government em-
ployes acting as jurors was first
presented to the Supreme Court
of the United States in Crawford
v. United States, 212 U. S. 183
(1908). That was a prosecution
in the District of Columbia by the
federal government for conspiracy
to defraud relative to a contract
with the postal department. One
of the jurors challenged was a
druggist who received $300 a year
as compensation for maintaining a
subpostal station. The Court, con-
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sidering the section of the Code of
Laws of the District (D. C. Code
1929, T. 18, §§357, 360) which ex-
empted salaried officers of the
government from jury service, ex-
pressed the opinion that the pro-
visions therein did not embrace
the entire subject of disqualifica-
tions, that by the common law all
servants of the government would
be disqualified and that this was
required by the use of the phrase
"an impartial jury" in the Sixth
Amendment. In 1935 Congress
sought to change the result of the
Crawford case by making govern-
ment employes available for jury
service. 49 STAT. 682. The con-
stitutionality of this statute was
attacked in Wood v. United States,
83 F. (2d) 587 (1936). Defendant
was convicted in the Police Court
of the District for petit larceny
from a private corporation. After
defendant's peremptory challenges
were exhausted, there remained on
the jury the recipient of a Civil
War pension and two clerks em-
ployed in the Treasury Depart-
ment and the Navy Yard. Each
of the challenges against these
persons upon the ground of in-
terest in the government was dis-
allowed. The court of appeals re-
versed the judgment, one judge
dissenting. The majority opinion,
following the Crawford case, stated
that all doubt had been foreclosed
on.the subject. Robb, dissenting,
distinguished the Crawford case,
saying that there was no statutory
provision present in that case in-
consistent with the common law
rule which he believed was cor-
rectly stated by Blackstone. He
concluded that the amendment
was constitutional. Both the ma-
jority and dissent recognized that
the statute if valid removed the
disqualification of more than 100,-
000 employes. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court, reviewing the
common law authorities, denied
that an absolute disqualification of
government servants existed. On
the basis of this research and in
the absence of a different practice
in the colonies, the Court refused
to follow the Crawford case, and
reversed. Wood v. United States,
57 S. Ct. 177 (1936). The Craw-
ford case could have been distin-
guished on its facts, since there
the employe was in the very de-
partment where the alleged con-
spiracy took place, but the Court
admits that that decision rested on
a broader ground. Thus, for all
practical purposes the Crawford
case is overruled.
As an alternative ground for its
decision the Court stated that even
if it could be said that at common
law an absolute disqualification
existed, Congress had the power
to remove it. The question thus
arises whether ar, absolute dis-
qualification of government em-
ployes is essential to the imparti-
ality of the jury. In Patton v.
United States, 281 U. S. 276, 288
(1930), the essential elements of
trial by jury were set forth: "(1)
that the jury should consist of
twelve men, neither more nor less;
(2) that the trial by jury should be
in the presence ... of a judge hav-
ing power to instruct them as to
the law and advise them in respect
of the facts; and (3) that the ver-
dict should be- unanimous." In a
leading case it was held that the
command of the Seventh Amend-
ment that the right of jury trial
shall be. preserved does not re-
quire that old forms of practice
and procedure be retained. Ex
parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 309
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(1920). The principle there enun-
ciated that "new devices may be
used to adapt the ancient institu-
tion to present needs and to make
of it an efficient instrument in the
administration of justice" is ap-
parent in Stilson v. United States,
250 U. S. 583 (1919) where the
number of peremptory challenges
was limited. In Tynan v. United
States, 297 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 9th,
1924) and Hoxie v. United States,
15 F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A. 9th,
1926), it was decided that women
were qualified to serve as jurors
though not so permitted at com-
mon law. Also, the wife of a de-
fendant in a federal criminal case
may act as a competent witness in
his behalf. Funk v. United States,
290 U. S. 371 (1933); Note (1935)
47 Harv. L. Rev. 853. The rea-
soning of those cases arising under
the Seventh Amendment is ap-
plicable under the Sixth Amend-
ment. Springlield v. Thomas, f66
U. S. 707 (1896).
As is stated by the court in the
Wood case, the Constitution lays
down no particular tests, and pro-
cedure is not confined to any an-
cient and artificial formula. "The
common law is not immutable but
flexible and by its own principle
adapts itself to varying condi-
tions." Funk v. United States,
supra; see also von Moschzisker,
The Common Law and Our Fed-
eral Jurisprudence (1925) 74 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 109, 388. It is true
that statutes in derogation of the
common law have been generally
strictly construed and the courts
have been hesitant to utilize them
as authority for overthFowing
principles of long standing, but the
common law system must often-
times give way to legislative policy.
In fact, it has been submitted that
our course of legal development
will lead courts to ultimately deal
with a statutory innovation by
holding it of superior authority to
judge-made rules on the same
general subject. Pound, Common
Law and Legislation (1908) 21
Harv. L. Rev. 383. The Supreme
Court is cognizant of this prin-
ciple: "And what courts can thus
do to assure the appropriate
growth and adaptation of the law
a fortiori can be achieved by the
action of a competent Legis-
lature." 57 S. Ct. at 184.
State courts enforcing require-
ments of state constitutions as to
trial by jury have allowed legisla-
tures considerable freedom in es-
tablishing qualifications for jury
service, though these involve de-
parture from common law rules.
Privitt v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co., 300 S. W. 726 (Mo. 1927);
Ex Parte Mana, 178 Cal. 213, 172
Pac. 986 (1918); Brown v. State,
62 N. J. 666, 42 Atl. 811 (1899);
Coughlin v. People, 144 Ill. 140, 33
N. E. 1 (1893); Spies v. Ill., 123 U.
S. 131, 167, 169 (1887); Stokes v.
People, 53 N. Y. 164 (1873). The
court in the Wood case, in its refu-
tation of the argument that a gov-
ernment employe would be a
biased juror against the accused,
admits that bias is an elusive con-
dition of the mind but states that
such a juror probably would be
no more biased than an ordinary
citizen. The only test as to the
competency of a juror should be
whether he is under such an in-
fluence as to prevent an unbiased
weighing of the evidence. Tuggle
v. State, 22 Okla. Cr. Rep. 1 209
Pac. t84 (1922). The influence ought
not be imputed on any extreme or
fanciful tests. There is no doubt
but that the Act of 1935 was passed
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to meet a public need and that no
interference with the actual im-
partiality of the jury was contem-
plated. H. R. Rep. No. 1421; Sen.
Rep. 1297, 74 Cong., 1st Sess. The
court recognizes that certain crimes
may be of peculiar interest to em-
ployes of certain governmental de-
partments. In such a case, the law
permits full inquiry as to actual
bias. 57 S. Ct. at 187; Priestly v.
State, 19 Ariz. 371, 374 (1918);
Tuggle v. State, supra.
EUGENE A. BUSCH.
PROCEDURE-RIGHT OF STATE TO
AN APPEAL OR WRIT OF ERROR UN-
DER STATUTE.-[Illinois] Ten sep-
arate indictments were returned
against defendant for the murder
of ten persons by burning a dwell-
ing. He was found guilty by jury
and sentenced on one of the in-
dictments. Thereafter he was called
to trial on the remaining nine in-
dictments, and to each he filed a
plea of autrefois convict. Over-
ruling the People's demurrer, the
court entered judgment discharg-
ing defendant and ordered that the
indictments be "set aside and dis-
missed." The People sued out a
writ of error under the 1933
amendment to the Criminal Code
which provides that "The people
may sue out writs of error to re-
view any order or judgment quash-
ing or setting aside an indictment
or information." ILL. STATE BAR
STATS. (f935) c. 38, §770. Appeal
dismissed. Held: The statute is
limited to those cases in which the
trial court has quashed or set aside
the indictment. Here the ruling of
the court was, in .legal effect, that
prosecution was barred under the
indictments, not an adjudication
that the indictments were bad. The
words "set aside and dismissed"
were mere surplusage. People v.
Vitale, 5 N. E. (2d) 474 (Ill. 1936).
Under the common law the state
has no right to sue out a writ of
error upon a judgment in favor
of the defendant in a criminal ac-
tion, whether rendered upon a ver-
dict of acquittal or upon the de-
termination of the court on a pre-
liminary question of law or fact.
United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S.
310 (1892); People v. Bork, 78 N.
Y. 346 (1879). Prior to 1700, the
decision of a trial court in a crim-
inal case was final. See Miller,
Appeals by the State in Criminal
Cases (1926) 36 Yale L. J. 486. In
the absence of a statute, no appeal
was permitted either to defendant
(cf. State v. Googins, 115 Me. 373,
374, 98 Atl. 1032 (1916)); or to the
state (United States v. Evans, 213
U. S. 297 (1909); People v. Royal, 2
Ill. 557 (1839); St. Paul v. Stamm,
106 Minn. 81, 118 N. W. 154 (1908);
State v. Davidson, 124 N. C. 839,
32 S. E. 957 (1899)), whether after
conviction or acquittal. In Eng-
land, however, an appeal was often
granted to the defendant as a mat-
ter of grace. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr.
2527, 2550 (K. B. 1770). Subse-.
quently, a writ of error came to be
regarded as a matter of right when
there was a possibility of an error
of law in the rulings of the trial
court. See Miller, supra. The
passage of the English Criminal
Appeal Act of 1907, 7 EDW. VII, c.
23, §3, made clear the right of the
defendant to an appeal from a con-
viction and sentence. The laws of
England do not, however, provide
for appeal or writs of error on the
part of the prosecution, except
that appeals on points of law may
be taken in exceptional cases from
decisions of the Court of Criminal
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Appeal to the House of Lords.
CRimINAL APPEAL ACT §1 (6). See
also Miller, supra, at 491. The
only case in which the Crown may
be permitted a new trial is where
fraud has been practised by the
accused, such as keeping witnesses
for the Crown in seclusion.
The common law of this coun-
try, however, never recognized the
early English practice, and granted
the defendant the right to a new
trial or a writ of error in a crim-
inal case. United States v. Sanges,
supra. It is now generally held
that upon judgment for the de-
fendant on demurrer the writ will
not lie (United States v. Sanges,
supra; Commonwealth v. Cum-
mings, 3 Cush. 212 (Mass. 1849);
People v. Corning, 2 N. Y. 9
(1884)) unless granted by statute.
People v. Apple, 57 Cal. App. 110,
206 Pac. 487 (1913); People v. Zo-
bel, 54 Colo. 284, 130 Pac. 837
(1913); State v. Robertson, 28
Okla. Cr. Rep. 234, 230 Pac. 932
(1924); State v. Spencer, 37 S. D.
219, 157 N. W. 662 (1916). Even
when a stautory provision exists,
it is construed strictly against the
state. State v. Raymond, 18 Colo.
242, 32 Pac. 429 (1893); State v.
Northrup, 13 Mont. 522, 35 Pac.
228 (1893); State v. Weathers, 13
Okla. Cr. Rep. 92, 162 Pac. 239
(1917).
The practice of issuing a writ of
error on behalf of the state is not
a common one. See Note (1935)
4 Fordham L. Rev. 130. A Mary-
land case is the first reported de-
cision on this subject in this coun-
try. In that case a writ of error
by the state was allowed though
no statute permitted it, after the
county court had sustained a de-
murrer to the indictment. State v.
Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317 (Md. 1821).
The court said, "the right should be
seldom exercised, and never for
oppression or without necessity."
Id. at 330. There have been de-
cisions to the same effect in a few
other jurisdictions. Thus the con-
tention has been made that the
state has a common law right to
appeal both in England and in the
United States. See Johnson, The
Right of the State to Sue Out a
Writ of Error in Criminal Cases
(1933) 11 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 85.
Jurisdictions which permit an
appeal by the state vary as to the
scope and as to when the right
may be exercised. In some juris-
dictions the state may have as
broad a right to appeal as the de-
fendant. Connecticut, under a
statute giving the state the same
right as the accused to appeal on
all questions of law arising in a
criminal case, adopts the view that
even after an acquittal the state
may appeal, or in case of a reversal,
may bring the defendant into court
again for a new trial. CoNN. GEN.
STAT. (1930) §6494; State v. Lee,
65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 111'0 (1894).
At the other extreme are those
states which allow no right of ap-
peal whatsoever. Such is the rule
in Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, and Texas. See Cur-
ran and Sunderland, The Organi-
zation and Operation of Courts of
Review, Third Report of the Ju-
dicial Council of Michigan (1933)
51, 211. See also Orfield, Appeal
by the State in Criminal Cases
(1935) 15 Ore. L. Rev. 306. In
Minnesota, the state is not per-
mitted to appeal or seek a review
in a criminal case at any time or
under any circumstances even on
a point of law arising prior to trial.
See Miller, supra, at 486. Between
these two extremes, the state may
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be entitled to appeal from va-
rious rulings of the court, not how-
ever in such a way as to effect an
acquittal. Curran and Sunderland
refer to twenty such states. Twen-
ty-one are listed in Note (1933)
10 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 373. Usu-
ally such appeal is from an order
setting aside or quashing an indict-
ment or information, from an or-
der sustaining a demurrer, from
an order in arrest of judgment, or
from an order granting a new trial.
See Orfield, supra. Many state
statutes provide that the state may
appeal from an order granting a
new trial. See Note (1933) 8f U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 340, 341, n. 4. The
Federal Criminal Appeal Act per-
mits the government to appeal by
writ of error from a decision or
judgment quashing, setting aside
or sustaining a demurrer to any
indictment where such decision or
judgment is based upon the in-
validity or construction of the
statute upon which the indictment
is founded; from an arrest of judg-
ment of conviction for insufficiency
of the indictment when the valid-
ity or construction of the statute is
in issue; and from a decision sus-
taining a special plea in bar, when
defendant is not put in jeopardy.
34 STAT. 1246 (1907), 18 U. S. C.
A. 682 (1927).
The reason most frequently
given by the courts for refusing
the state the right to appeal is that
to do so would result in placing
the defendant in double jeopardy.
Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S.
100 (1904). This objection, how-
ever, is only applicable to appeals
from verdicts of acquittal. It does
not apply to appeals from an or-
der of the court quashing an in-
dictment or sustaining a demurrer
to it. The defendant has not been
put in jeopardy, since no jury has
been sworn. The objection does
not apply even after acquittal, if
the decision on appeal is simply
to determine the law in future
cases. It does not apply from an
order granting a new trial, nor
from an order in arrest of judg-
ment, nor from a ruling on a ques-
tion of law adverse to the state
when the defendant was convicted
and appeals from the judgment,
nor from the sentence. See Or-
field, supra. It should be noted
that five states, Connecticut, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, North Caro-
lina and Vermont, do not have a
double jeopardy provision in their
constitutions.
In Illinois prior to 1933 a writ of
error did not lie dn behalf of the
state in criminal cases. People v.
Glodo, 12 Ill. App. 348 (1883);
People v. Dill, 2 Ill. 257 (1836).
It was held in People v. Royal, 2
Ill. 557 (1839), that the double
jeopardy provision in the Consti-
tution prohibits the state from
bringing a writ of error where a
person accused of a crime is ac-
quitted in the court below. In
People v. Barber, 348 Ill. 40 (1932)
noted (1933) 23 J. Crim. L. 1039,
the court held that the People
could not have a writ of error to
review a judgment quashing an
indictment even though there was
no contention that the defendant
was put in jeopardy prior to the
judgment. In People v. Kopman,
358 Ill. 479, 1'93 N. E. 516 (1934),
the court, in allowing an appeal
from an order quashing the indict-
ment, said, "The legislation in 1933
was remedial and intended to sup-
ply those defects in the law which
prevented a review of an order
quashing an indictment." Cf. Peo-
ple v. Williamson, 290 Ill. App. 93
(1935), where an appeal was taken
from a judgment quashing an in-
dictment.
There may be valid reasons why
the People in criminal prosecu-
tions should not be debarred from
the benefits given defendants. But
in the instant case, since the de-
murrer put in issue only the valid-
ity of the plea in bar, the sustain-
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ing of the plea, while to all
practical effects amounting to a
quashing of the indictment, did
not clearly fall within the language
of the statute. The statute being
in derogation of the strict com-
mon law rules, it is for the legis-
lature rather than for the court to
broaden the right of the People to
appeal.
MAX M. FLEisHr.
